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Darwinian Storied Residence. 
An introduction to the Work 
of Holmes Rolston III 
Hicham-Stéphane Afeissa
Académie de Dijon, France
A key issue of environmental ethics is to identify intrinsic objects of valuation within the natural
environment. Such intrinsic natural values are fundamental prerequisites to frame moral obligations
to nature. This paper gives a global perspective on Holmes Rolston’s philosophy. By deploying the
evolutionary history of life on earth, Rolston draws attention to the formidable creativity which drives
it so that it commands respect and admiration. This paper contends that his work lies at the
intersection of epistemology of natural sciences, moral philosophy and religious studies. The
Darwinian model is used to define the main thematic concepts in Rolston’s philosophy and, in greater
depth, the general trend of his thinking.
Holmes Rolston III is University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State University
and could well be referred to as the founding father of Anglo-American environmental ethics, a
philosophical field of investigation which emerged in the early 1970s. Born on November 19, 1932
in Staunton, Virginia, Dr. Rolston is the son and grandson of Presbyterian ministers, whose name
and faith he shares—the reason why he says he is the third of his line. As he recounted, the house
in which he spent his childhood, in the heartland of the celebrated Shenandoah Valley, had neither
electricity nor running water, but was uniquely instrumental in giving the young environmentalist
his initial immersion in a luxuriant and wild natural countryside. Dr. Rolston first studied physics
and mathematics at Davidson College, North Carolina, but soon turned to biology. In 1953, he
enrolled in a university course in Theology and Religious Studies which he began at the Union
Theological Seminary of Virginia and completed at the University of Edinburgh, where he gained a
Ph.D. in 1958, under the tutelage of Thomas F. Torrance1. In the following decade, while he served
as minister of the Presbyterian Church, not far from the Appalachian mountains, in the company
of his wife and two children, he continued studying, reading mineralogy, zoology, palaeontology,
botany, ecology, and furthered his expertise in biology (both general and evolutionary) through
personal research and courses at the University of Tennessee which he attended as an auditor. He
also began to earn a reputation as an environmental activist when he militated in favour of the
conservation of certain wild species indigenous to the Appalachians. His growing taste for
philosophy led to enrolment in the University of Pittsburgh where he received a Master’s degree in
the Philosophy of Science in 1968. He obtained his first teaching post that same year at the
Colorado State University in Fort Collins, where he taught during his entire academic career.
It is only rarely that a philosopher’s academic training so precisely sets out in advance the
theoretical framework for his thinking as it develops over the ensuing years. Dr. Rolston’s written
works represent an impressive collection of over two hundred articles and a half dozen books, all
focused on the exact point where the epistemology of natural sciences, moral philosophy and
religious studies intersect with environmental ethics, Rolston’s specific contribution to the renewal
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1 A highly significant tutelage as we shall see. T.F. Torrance (1913-2007) was probably the greatest British theologian of the 20th
century. A prolific author, he was instrumental, inter alia, in the re-discovery of Oriental patristic literature and authored a landmark
reading of Calvin’s theology; a tireless translator, he was successful in introducing the thoughts of Karl Barth to the English-speaking
world, in particular when he supervised the 13-volume translation of the monumental Kirliche Dogmatik; a self-taught genius, he
made a decisive contribution to the study of the relationship between theology and the natural and physical sciences—thereby paving
the way for Rolston’s own work and those of Peacocke, Polkinghorne, Barbour, Wentzel van Huyssteen, et al., to which we shall
return. For his work as a whole, Torrance was awarded the Templeton Prize in 1978, which Rolston also won in 2003. See his
recipient’s acceptance statement at http://www.templetonprize.org/pdfs/Templeton_Prize_Chronicle_2003.pdf.
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of the dialogue between science and religion initiated at the end
of the 1960s by Thomas F. Torrance2. This in itself is evidence of
how difficult it is to sketch the outlines of a literary production
which, to be fully understood, must respect this triple polarisation
which makes it so valuable and original. 
In scientific terms, Holmes Rolston is not only a remarkably well-
informed reader of the latest advances of neo-Darwinian theory,
but also a thinker who seeks to take fully into account the multiple
contemporary ramifications of Darwinism in such diverse
domains as socio-biology, behavioural ecology and evolutionary
psychology. Darwinism, taken in the broadest acceptance of the
term, defines the dominant paradigm determining the main
thematic concepts in Rolston’s philosophy and ecological theology
and, in greater depth, the general trend of his thinking. Not that H.
Rolston seeks to use this approach, as would Daniel C. Dennett or
Richard Dawkins, as a “universal acid” to erode and dissolve
generally accepted ideas and beliefs (religious ones in particular)
which are incompatible with the lessons taught by the theory of
evolution. On the contrary, he uses it to demonstrate that this type
of scientific explanation of the natural world, which discovers in
nature an order which is both rational and contingent, raises a
certain number of borderline issues which are an encouragement
to discover new and unexpected forms of rational order in a
approach supplementing science.
Rolston’s particular interest in the epistemological neo-
Darwinian model for the elucidation of the history of life on earth,
is that its effect is to blur irreversibly the boundary between the
“nomologic” and the “idiographic” sciences3; between the study
of factual sequences and concatenations and the study of the
creation of a value system, as evidenced in a certain way by the
existence of Darwinian anthropology and sociology; and also the
methodological impossibility of eliminating from natural
evolution all traces of any narrative content by reducing it to a
random succession of causal sequences. There is certainly no
cause to deny that contingency is the very root of life on earth
since the onset of replication and the inevitable mutations which
accidentally disturb the process of transmission of genetic
information, but what is implied by the concept of “genetic
information” itself must be ascertained:
An organism is “informed” about how to make its way
through the world, how to cope in its niche. Past
achievements are recapitulated in the present, with
variations; these results are tested today and then folded
into the future. Random mutation figures into a larger
generative process; species generate and test new
possibilities. The challenge is to get as much versatility
coupled with as much stability as possible. This requires
keeping past knowledge while exploring nearby areas for
better adaptation. (Rolston, H., 2005b, p. 49) 
The capacity to acquire, store and transmit new information
radically distinguishes the process of life on earth from any
geological process; unlike hydrological, climatological and
orogenic cycles, the cycles of birth, life and death and genetic
transmission benefit from the incomparable advantage of
cumulative information. That is why evolutionary biology is
historical through and through, as neither physics nor geophysics
can aspire to be. Where little more than matter and energy
existed, three billion years ago appeared a new state of matter,
neither liquid nor gaseous—a vital state—which, through the
working of genetic information and natural selection, generated
some five to ten million animal species and the extraordinary
diversity and complexity of life on earth. The process of life,
considered at the macro- and mega-evolutionary level, is
pervaded by a force of neguentropy and a power of creativity
which the standard model of the synthetic theory of evolution
cannot render. The emergence of life, biodiversity or the general
propensity for growing complexity, are not the product of pure
chance or of a miracle. They are rather the most probable
consequence of evolution taking place not in a world of infinite
possibilities, but in a world where chance plays its role amid
natural constraints which are such that life inevitably would
happen, diversify and become complex4.
However, the “logic” of life does not take kindly to being reduced
to a scanty set of natural laws to which initial conditions are
appended. As Rolston says, no one can assume microbes as a
premise and deduce trilobites as a conclusion: 
I cannot give you an argument explaining all this history that
has gone before—some logic by which there came to be
primeval Earth, Precambrian protozoans, Cambrian
trilobites, Triassic dinosaurs, Eocene mammals, Pliocene
primates, eventuating in Pleistocene homo sapiens. (...) The
theory neither predicts outcomes, nor, looking back after
the outcomes are known, retrodicts why these events
rather than thousands of other courses of events equally
consistent with the theory failed to take place. (Rolston, H.,
1986, p. 96). 
2 A selective bibliography of Dr. Rolston’s written work is listed at the end of this introduction. There is no exhaustive bibliography at this time, but the most comprehensive list is to be
found at the end of the collective volume on Dr. Rolston: Ch. Preston and W. Ouderkirk (eds.), (2007). He is generally held to be the founding father of environmental ethics in view of
the impact of his article published in 1975 in the prestigious journal Ethics (Rolston, H., 1975), which defines—probably as no one else had done before—a programme for environmental
ethics. Another factor was the creation (with E. Hargrove) of the publication Environmental Ethics. For comment on the multidisciplinary style of Dr. Rolston’s work and on the make-
up of the field of research of which it is a part, see Ian G. Barbour (2000) or H. Rolston himself (Rolston, H., 1987). As for the use of Darwinism in a theological and ecological perspective,
see the recent and very exhaustive study by R. Attfield (2006). 
3 Following the distinction between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften first proposed by Dilthey and later systematised by Windelband and Rickert, later to become widely
disseminated well beyond the neo-Kantian sphere. In Rolston’s view, it is remarkable that this distinction was made at the very time when the Darwinian revolution made it more than
ever ineffective. 
4 Rolston adopts a standpoint in an ongoing debate between the life sciences specialists, opposing on the one hand those who believe in radical contingency and that “The Universe was
not pregnant with life, nor the biosphere with Man” (inter alia J. Monod, F. Jacob, S. J. Gould, S. Weinberg, M. Ruse) and on the other hand, those who believe in the theory of “mandatory”
evolution (a process that must be seen as inevitable despite its indeterminate course) and who interpret contingency as generating complexity (Ch. De Duve, S. Conway Morris, S. A.
Kauffman). Since the late 1980s, the terms of this debate have been reformulated in the context of a renascent dispute between science and religion—a dispute which has had a
worldwide impact and very numerous implications (political, philosophical and scientific)—opposing on the one hand Darwinians of strict obedience openly militating in favour of
atheism (R. Dawkins and D. Dennett in particular, and more widely the Brights movement) and, on the other hand, the advocates of Intelligent Design who have never concealed their
closeness to religious circles (W. Dembski and M. Behe in particular). Rolston clearly seeks to strike a course between these different standpoints: he supports a weakly teleological
effect on the evolutionary process—thus supporting in part the advocates of Intelligent Design—but also emphasises that there is a part played by irrepressible novelty and unpredictable
emergence which presides over the history of life on earth which must not be underestimated, in line with a thesis radicalised by the ultra-Darwinians.
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All we can do at this point, is to tell a story—the story of life on
earth—in such a way that the living epic is adequate to account
fully for each individual life and each evolutionary line.
Consequently, there is no sense, in Rolston’s view, in trying to
justify the intrinsic value of a natural being, as though there could
be a “logic” in the defence of the existence per se of spotted owls
or lemurs. Both are specific forms of life which have managed to
survive in their respective environments over time, over a long
history which has enriched the history of life on earth. And that in
itself should suffice to justify their existence. This point is worth
emphasising: if “demonstration” is taken to mean a necessary
relationship between premise and conclusion without
consideration of the attitude of subjects regarding these proposals,
then attributing an intrinsic value to the entities of the natural
world is not in fact demonstrated as such by Rolston himself5. The
abundance of scientific information that Rolston calls on page after
page in his complete works aims to prepare the ground on which
environmental ethics can be built, on the basis that “We always
shape our values in significant measure in accord with our notion
of the kind of universe that we live in, and this drives our sense of
duty” (Rolston, H., 1998, p. 143). The way in which the world seems
to be (that which our natural and physical sciences teach us)
delineates the horizon on which are outlined the ultimate aims
determining what must be, perhaps not by logical implication but
at least via some kind of abductive inference.
At this stage, the general meaning of Rolston’s environmental
philosophy becomes more accessible. By seeking to obtain the
recognition of the presence of objective natural values whose
intrinsic existence is not in any way dependent on the subject who
evaluates, but are in fact present in the world, inscribed almost in
the very substance of the world, where the mind encounters or
discovers them rather than giving them to the world, Rolston seeks
to reset human experience in this scene as constituting one of the
types of values which has a moral content—the richest no doubt,
but not unique—so that we may learn to recognise the (objective)
value of what we in fact (subjectively) do not value. In doing so, we
may determine a set of duties beyond our own preferences. 
Environmental ethics thus defined, it is clear that for Rolston, the
object is not human ethics applied to the environment, nor is it
ethics applied to the use of resources, of costs and benefits, of
damage and improvement as implied by the management of our
natural environment, for both present and future generations,
since this kind of ethic is unable to raise the issue of our
relationship with nature other than in terms of prudent
husbandry instead of with the respect that recognition of the
existence of the world’s intrinsic values can command.
The fundamental problem encountered by environmental ethics
adopting such a programme is to find out, on the one hand, how
to determine what constitutes an intrinsic object of valuation
within the natural environment, in terms which must be able to
include objects of traditional moral concern (such as the
individual members of some animal species), but also—if ethics
is to be environmental—of the more unlikely entities (such as
entire species, ecosystems, etc.); and on the other hand, how to
base a certain number of moral obligations and, more generally,
human obligations to nature, on the recognition of the existence
of intrinsic natural values. Rolston’s stratagem consists in
deploying for its own sake, with quite an abundance of detail, the
evolutionary history of life on earth as it was made intelligible
through neo-Darwinism, while drawing attention to the
formidable creativity which drives it so that it commands respect
and admiration.
It is for this purpose that Rolston invites his readers to consider
more carefully the reign of life (ranging from the most
rudimentary plant forms to multicellular animals), while he
teaches them to wonder at the treasures of organisation, self-
regulation and functional substitution which are the ubiquitous
evidence that there exists something which is akin to intelligence
of life, a plasticity and a capacity for recovering its forms by a
growing organism capable of healing its wounds, resisting death
and reproducing itself. “Every genetic set is in this sense a
(nonmoral) normative set, proposing what ought to be beyond
what is.” notes Rolston (Rolston, H., 1988, p. 257). Seen from that
angle, to say that a natural being possesses an intrinsic value
independently of conscious human attribution of such a value, is
tantamount to recognising for that being the capacity to have its
own agenda, inherent through genetic programming, which can
be deployed and attained autonomously6.
But analysis and the feeling of wonder which is its correlate
cannot stop there: a natural being is itself only because it is part
of a whole, in that it is a member of a specific population that
adapted through the evolutionary process to the ecological niche
which it inhabits, which itself is closely connected to a larger
biotic community within a network of ecosystems ranked in
successive levels of integration. That being so, although natural
beings individually construct their intrinsic value, the vital
interests they defend are always those of their own existence and
this value could be transferred so to speak from one level of
integration to another, passing successively from the individual
natural beings to the species of which they are members, and
then from that species to all the species and the biotic
communities which, at some point (in a synchronic perspective)
and at all moments in the history of life on earth (in a diachronic
perspective), are interrelated; and finally from these transhistoric
biotic communities to the multiple abiotic components of the
environment with which they are interdependent, up to and
including nature as a whole.
5 That being so, Rolston is in excellent company, because there is no evidence that Bentham ever justified the central proposition that “Nature has placed mankind under the governance
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do”.—Jeremy Bentham , The Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1789) Ch I.; nor Locke the notion that “The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it” (...) according to which “No one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty or possessions”. (Second Treatise on Civil Government); nor Kant who is content to declare solemnly that “There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world,
or indeed anything at all outside it, that can be held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good will” (Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, first section). This decisive
point has been neglected, we believe, by some interpreters of Rolston’s work who thought they had detected at that level an extension of Kant’s ideas on the attribution of ends in
themselves, whereas this interpretation does not have any textual support and is explicitly contradicted in numerous statements by the author emphasising that his position is not based
on reason and is not logically necessary.
6 There is in that context a “teleological centre of life”, as stated by Paul Taylor. But, unlike again other interpretations of Rolston’s philosophy, we believe that the similarities between
the two authors end at that point, since Rolston never justifies (and makes no attempt to) the notion that a natural being values what is of benefit to its own existence, no more than he
deduces from the “interests” that a natural being seems to be displaying that humans have any duty to that natural being. 
beings—so that men are inspired to believe that they are part of
the immensity of nature and that duties are incumbent upon them
because they are the actors of a tale that is not fully told: 
I cannot give you an argument explaining how humans
arrived, some logic by which the Earth story eventuates in
homo sapiens. No theory exists from which we follow as
conclusions. (...) What I can do is invite you as a historical
subject to appreciate the objective story that lies in, with and
under the Earth we inhabit, to enrich the story by telling it.
You can be a microcosm of the macrocosm and enjoy your
storied residence here. (Rolston, H., 1986, p. 97)9
The concept of “storied residence” which Rolston uses habitually
and in many variations (“storied place”, “storied natural history”,
“storied fitness”, etc.) is central to all his environmental policy
constructions. It can be understood in two ways. 
First of all, following a clearly bioregionalist modulation, the
concept refers to the “place attachment” that humans cultivate
according to their historical or geographical background, to the
topography and cultural environment where they live and within
which their personal history evolves. From this angle, Rolston
points out that it is worthwhile to reinvest humanity’s sojourn on
earth with tangible warmth, making sure that effective
specificities, the continuity that defines a place as time passes
and the complex tissue of territorial sediment which makes up
its physiognomic identity, related to the way in which the
community’s establishment in a given place was historically
arrived at, are not left out. But not with the intention of
preserving a set of museum pieces, rather to comply with the
notion that habitation, as a process of shaping a dwelling, is the
product of a slow and unpredictable appropriation of tradition, a
complex set of actions, memories and identities. Inhabited
territories are a kind of diagram of the meaning that a
community or a culture gives itself and includes in the visible
pattern of a specific landscape or built-up area so that it can tell
a tale to its descendents centuries later. If we accept that built-
up areas and the countryside can be defined as forming a
“cultural locality”, the violation of their formal and symbolic
identity will result in the disruption of aesthetic and natural
values and of memory and will affect the conditions in which a
given historical intergenerational community was able to
imprint an environmental entity with its own style, so that it
became a region in life on earth (a “bioregion”). These
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When natural history is skilfully recounted, it should eventually
inspire a feeling of respectful awe and admiration7—that
paralysing sense of being overwhelmed by a superior creative
power that envelops and assigns us our place in creation, in
which the human species is simply a chapter in the odyssey of life
on Earth:
Every species is a “display” or “show” (...) in the natural
history book. These stories are plural, diverse, erratic, but
they are not wholly fragmented episodes. The pressures of
natural selection pull them into roles into their communities,
fit them into niches, give continuity to the stories, and make
more unified ecosystemic stories of the many stories. Always
there are themes in their settings, characters moving
through space and time, problems and their resolutions, the
plotting of life paths. Exceeding the births and deaths of
individual members, a specific form of life unfolds an
intergenerational narrative. What humans are bound to
respect in natural history is (...) the living drama, continuing
with all its actors. (Rolston, H., 1988, p. 145) 
The crucial importance of choosing a narrative model to
understand the successive forms of life begins to be clearer. As J.-
Y. Goffi (2000) rightly remarks, to a large degree this is a novel
variation on the theme of the Great Book of Nature: Galileo invited
readers to learn its timeless language, that of mathematics,
without which it is humanly impossible to understand even a
single word, but Rolston invites us, in harmony with the model of
neo-Darwinian intelligibility, to trace the development and
intricacy of life lines through time, to rediscover behind current
forms of life the long history of which they are the heirs, to grasp
for its own sake the long and painstaking process of life on Earth—
this true miracle of creativity—investing the beings it calls into
existence with a dignity that commands respect. The history of life
reveals nature as “projective”, developing projects, tracing a
lineage, constructing ecosystemic equilibria, within a framework
where nothing is left to chance, where everything plays a role,
however modest, and where nevertheless, anything is possible. If
only humans can learn to admire this scene they are an integral
part of, can learn to wonder at the breadth and the length of the
biotic enterprise, they cannot but be concerned about the part they
play in it and aspire to cease acting like vandals8. 
Here again, all we can do is tell a story—the story of that long
sequence of events which led to the arrival on the scene of human
7 This is of course one of the main points of entry (but only one of many and not even the most original) to Rolston’s ecological theology. The word he always uses to describe this
sentiment is “awe”, a word which traditionally designates in religious literature the wonderment of the believer in the presence of the mysterium tremendum fascinans et augustum,
which R. Otto renamed: the “feeling of the numinous”. However, H. Rolston does not specifically refer to a religious experience: it is also aesthetic, in the tradition here of the aesthetic
of the sublime, for which the object of admiration is given as the power of nature, in all its exuberance and fecundity,. In a word, all that is “wild”, contrasting with all that is domesticated,
anthropized and contrived. The aesthetics of nature that H. Rolston defends—and it features very prominently in his thinking—is the aesthetics of the swamp, of those opaque and
chaotic places where the crucible of creation can be glimpsed, much more than it is the aesthetics of a landscape and of a sunset (see Rolston, H. , 2000). Rolston’s ecological theology
is essentially based on an interpretation of nature as a kenotic process—nature viewed as “cruciform”—thus adopting a relatively novel standpoint in the context of modern theology,
as was ably demonstrated by Lisa H. Sideris (2003).
8 That at any rate is Rolston’s wager and is evidence that the position he is defending is closer than he cares to recognise to environmental virtue ethics, which he wrongly interprets as
being anthropocentric. Environmental virtue ethics is an extension in the environmental ethics field of the teleologic or communautarist types of ethics which emerged in the 1970s
in connection with the censure of the dominant deontological or utilitarian ethics. The central point consists in arguing that since ecology is a developing science, it can never be
sufficiently explicit for it to be possible to apply a definition of what is right or wrong directly on a case-by-case basis, which is why it is important to acquire the habit of respecting
nature and granting moral consideration to the entities of the natural world. Therefore, although environmental virtue ethics deals in effect with actions to be undertaken, it only does
so obliquely, by taking into account the attitudes and practices which support them, so that by the same token it can elude having to examine specifically each singular action.
9 The expression “storied residence” does not translate easily. In English, the word “storied” has several meanings. It can designate that which is illustrious or glorious (e.g. “the storied
journey of the Mayflower”), or in a description of a tapestry or the capital of a pillar, the decoration of a scene with figures, in particular scenes from the Scriptures (as in the French
word “historier”). Rolston plays on both these meanings, to which in English is added the notion of a narrative, a story or a romance as in a tale recounting real or imaginary events
(e.g. a “love story”). Evolutionary history is, par excellence, without any need to endow it with any Panglossian orientation, a “storied natural history” because, taken altogether, it is the
history of the triumph of life and in particular the triumph of the species that are still in existence and have co-evolved. In French, the adjective formed from the word “légende” seems
to cover the same semantic ground.
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considerations are surely sufficiently powerful to justify
submitting town and country planning policies to a certain
number of rules10. 
But more fundamentally, the “storied residence” of humans is to
be taken as meaning that its nature is evolutionary and ecological
and that it is therefore a reminder of the kinship of humans with
all the other living beings with which they co-evolved as “fellow
voyagers in the odyssey of evolution”, whose survival depends on
the integrity of a certain number of ecological processes.
However, unlike many environmental ethicists, Rolston refrains
from drawing on this undeniable common origin of all the forms
of life on earth to construct an ethic founded on a biotic
community. He prefers to insist on the cultural specificity of the
“storied residence” of humans for whom particular pride of place
in creation must be observed: 
Humans superimpose cultures on the wild nature out of which
they once emerged, with radical innovations. Information in
wild nature travels intergenerationally on genes; information
in culture travels neurally as people are educated into
transmissible cultures. Though the higher animals can learn
limited behaviors from parents and conspecifics, animals do
not form transmissible cultures. (Rolston, H., 1994, p. 2)
Let us be clear: Rolston in no way seeks to find for humans the
possibility of surpassing nature—if that were so, humans would be
seen as essentially alien to nature, in a perspective which would seem
far from compatible with the Darwinian paradigm and, more
generally, with the very scheme of environmental ethics—but more of
a reiteration of nature. The transition of nature to culture in Rolston’s
thinking takes place through an evolutionary process of the mind
giving rise, so to speak, to a second nature based on the one that is our
human heritage, by virtue of the very exercise of the mind’s innate
capacity for reflection and learning, which not content with
augmenting its cognitive capacities, also endows them with
specialisation.. Recent advances in the neurosciences have taught us
that it is not sufficient to say that cerebral structure and function
determine the conditions allowing psychic activity, but that
reciprocally, the dynamics of synaptic connections and of the neuronal
networks linked to the exercise of psychic capacities lead to a
reorganisation of the brain through what neurologists call “cerebral
plasticity”, and orchestrate profuse construction and destruction of
our “mental maps”. Cerebral activity is a natural power, generating its
own rebirth through the reversal of cause and effect, so that it ceases
to be the sole product of our genes and expresses the permanent
modifications imposed by our personal history11. 
Once the discontinuity between nature and culture is established,
it becomes a convenient touchstone to determine which duties are
incumbent upon us in our relationships with various entities in the
natural world and with other human beings. For example, is it our
duty to relieve suffering, as best we can, regardless of who is
affected? Rolston’s response deserves to be quoted at length:
It might be thought that pain is a bad thing, whether in nature
or culture. Perhaps when dealing with humans in culture,
additional levels of value and utility must be protected by
conferring rights that do not exist in the wild, but meanwhile at
least we should minimize animal suffering. That is indeed a
worthy imperative in culture where animals are removed from
nature and bred, but it may be misguided when animals
remain in ecosystems. (...) Pain in ecosystems is instrumental
pain, through which the sheep are naturally selected for a
more satisfactory adaptive fit. (...) The question, Can they
suffer? is not as simple as Bentham thought. What we ought
to do depends on what is. The is of nature differs significantly
from the is of culture, even when similar suffering is present in
both. (Rolston, H., 1998, p. 128)
To demand that the virtues of compassion and charity, justice and
honesty apply to any form of life, independently of the place it
occupies in the network of life and whether or not it belongs to the
natural wild or to a specific culture, would mean abandoning any
attempt to discriminate between orders that are essentially separate.
Socio-biology makes an exactly opposite mistake in believing in
“gene morality”: no conclusion—and even less justification—can be
drawn regarding the social organisation of humans from the fact
that evolution selects a particular genetic trait, which increases the
prevalence of the specific gene or genes in the genetic pool of the
species concerned. Inclusive fitness and altruistic kin selection may
well be powerful instruments, explaining animal behaviour when
they help members of their bloodline, in the interest of the genes of
their shared inheritance, but they do not have any descriptive or
regulatory value in explaining the merciful attitude of which the
parable of the Good Samaritan is a paradigm.12
As a consequence, there must be no confusion between two very
different claims: that nature can provide the norms on which to
10 On this point, Rolston generally mentions the work associated with Kirkpatrick Sale’s bioregionalist trend. See (in French) the special issue of the review Eléments, “Le localisme. Une
réponse à la mondialisation”, (n° 100, 2001). It may seem surprising that Rolston never refers to J. Brinckerhoff Jackson’s remarkable work, although it triggered a revolution in the
study of landscapes in the 20th century and the theories he supported are very close to Rolston’s own: see J.B. Jackson (1980), and the issue of the review Le Visiteur (n° 5, 2000) that
is almost entirely focused on this author. But, presumably, as happens once in while, Jackson is probably better known in France than in his own country. 
11 See on this subject H. Rolston (2005a). The concept of “cerebral plasticity” follows explicitly a concept deriving from neo-Darwinism. G. Edelman speaks of “neuronal Darwinism” on
this subject and J.-P. Changeux of “epigenesis by selective stabilization of neurons”. Although the concept of neuroplasticity is a new one, the act of guaranteeing the passage of nature
to the mind by a replication of the mind itself reminds us irresistibly of Hegel: the spirit is the single moment in Hegelian philosophy where the same expression is used for the result
and the beginning. The Philosophy of Nature ends with a study of the spirit and of its functions, whereas the Philosophy of Mind starts with a study of the spirit and of its functions. For
both Hegel and Rolston, the terminal boundary of nature and the initial boundary of the mind are closely related; for both Hegel and Rolston, it is the form of relationship in time which
is the essence of anthropological differentiation (a function of cultural and educational tradition for the one, and a function of the power of habituation as a condition for any learning
process, for the other). The schematic character of the dualist-interactionist theory supported by Rolston is perhaps to be regretted as is the absence of serious discussion of progress
in the field of evolutive robotics and artificial intelligence. 
12 “The Morality of the Gene” is the heading of the first chapter of Edward O. Wilson’s founding book (1975). The concepts: “the selfish gene” and “kin selection” were developed
respectively by R. Dawkins and J. Maynard-Smith. Here again H. Rolston defends a standpoint in a debate that has generated a great deal of discussion in recent years, opposing those
who seek to explain moral behaviours in terms of “ultimate causes” (E. Mayr), i.e. causes whose study requires recourse to evolution (inter alia, F. de Waal, R. Alexander, R. Trivers,
E. Sober and D. S. Wilson), and those who consider that morality transcends per se biological functions, mostly based on Christian perspectives (St. Pope, Ph. Clayton, Rolston himself).
Rolston attaches considerable importance to, and has no hesitation in applauding the considerable success of recent developments in behavioural ecology and evolutionary psychology.
But he believes that both trends fail to recognise the truly emergent dimension of human culture, which has introduced a radical and irrepressible novelty into the history of evolution.
See in particular on this point Rolston (1993, 2004).
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base a limitation of the actions that are allowable in the natural
world; and that nature can teach us how we should behave towards
each other. It may well be that nature holds some objective intrinsic
values that humans must respect, even if these values are not the
conscious outcome of a subject’s evaluation and deliberation.
Animals with the gift of awareness, plants and ecosystems are not
moral agents but may be recognised as having an intrinsic value
and therefore an impact on the deliberations of those moral agents
who discover them within the natural world.
The whole purpose of ecological ethics is to reveal such natural
values—those which are inscribed in the world’s raw material
and which are swept along on the current of evolution, as well as
those which are interlocked with to the storied residence of
humans on earth—so as to provide a rational basis to support
decisions on environmental policies. 
In conclusion, we must note that whatever policies we finally decide
to adopt, they can not be limited to simply preserving national natural
values—much the same way as Mark Sagoff (1974) once proposed to
set aside the natural indigenous environment of the United States to
serve as testimony to the existence and history of the first settlers, so
that Americans—who, unlike the inhabitants of the Old World, have
no ancestral scientific and artistic traditions—could maintain a living
link with their past. While each natural value represents a fabric of
stories woven by the multiple intricate strands of evolution, it is not
possible to reduce such values to their sole and fleeting geographic
existence and to confine them artificially within national borders,
because it is only when the tale is told that it becomes reality. For this
reason, in the same way that the path of any individual life always
spans, unknowingly, phylogenetic mutations over centuries of time,
for Rolston there can be no policy unless it is planetary and no justice
unless it is interspecific.
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